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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
wholly statutory, and, when defective, cannot be cured by the application
of equitable principles." St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wisconsin
Trust Company (1926) 189 Wis. 483, 206 N. W. 921; Helm v. Goin et al.
(1929) 227 Ky. 773, 14 S. W. (2d) 183; Rahn v. Hamilton (1916) 144 Ga.
644, 87 S. E. 1061.
Although confined to Missouri, the doctrine of equitable adoption seems
to work substantial justice. Adoption proceedings have been given a
judicial character expressly "for the welfare of the child." R. S. Mo.
(1929) sec. 14078; after the adoption relationship has existed for years,
a decree of equitable enforcement of a promise to adopt will surely have
no harmful effect upon the dignity of the statute. Any other course would
allow the heirs of the deceased, who stand in his position, to profit by his
wrongdoing at the expense of the child. Such an interpretation of the
adoption statute would destroy the rights of the child by applying a
statutory provision made expressly for his protection and benefit.
H. J., '34.
BUSINESS TRUSTS-BANKRUPTCY-POSITION OF UNIT HoLDERs.-An estop-
pel to contest the validity of a sale by a trustee in bankruptcy was held to
have arisen because the unit holders in a business trust had filed their
claims and received dividends as creditors of the bankrupt estate. Page v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. (C. C. A. 8, 1931) 53 F. (2d) 27. The tacit
approval of such a procedure is significant since this is the first case in
which a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has been called upon to consider
the proper treatment of such unit holders in bankruptcy proceedings against
the business trust. It is true that the opinion also relies upon doctrines of
res judicata and merger to sustain its result, but on these later points alone
the decision of the same Court on a former appeal was exactly opposite.
Page v. Natural Gas & Fuel Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 462 (re-
manded by three different judges to determine if there had been laches in
bringing this suit).
It is well settled that a business trust may become a bankrupt. Under
the earlier law the phrase "unincorporated company" had been held to in-
clude such an organization. In re Associated Trust (D. C. D. Mass. 1914)
222 F. 1012; Gallagher v. Hannigan (C. C. A. 1, 1925) 5 F. (2d) 171;
National Bankruptcy Act sec. 4b, 30 Stat. 547 (1898), 11 U. S. C. sec. 22.
It could become a voluntary bankrupt as it was a "person" for this pur-
pose. Matter of Sargent Lumber Co. (D. C. E. D. Ark. 1923) 287 F. 154.
In 1926 Congress amended the definition of corporation set forth in the
first section of the Act so as to include under that head "any business con-
ducted by a trustee, or trustees, wherein beneficial interest or ownership is
evidenced by certificate or other written instrument." 44 Stat. (part 2)
662 (1926) 11 U. S. C. sec. 1. In the present case the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding was instituted in 1924 and hence was governed by the older law.
In none of the few previous cases dealing with the bankruptcy of these
Massachusetts' trusts has the position of the unit holder been seriously
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considered. If these organizations are to be classed as "unincorporated
companies" or "corporations" it would seem that the unit holder could
certainly not be treated more favorably than the share holder of any
ordinary company, and there is some dictum to support this view. Galla-
gher v. Hannigan, supra. But by all the canons of corporate law a stock-
holder is to be treated in bankruptcy proceedings like a part-owner of the
business and not a creditor of it. The cases dealing with business trusts
outside of the narrow field of their status in bankruptcy have established
the fact that the unit holder is in very many instances a person liable for
the debts of the trust rather than the holder of any right as creditor
against the trust assets. To determine the nature and extent of this lia-
bility, it is necessary in most states to discover whether the particular
organization will be treated by the courts as being a partnership or a true
trust. The usual test is whether the "trustees" or the unit holders have
the ultimate power of control over the affairs of the business. Frost v.
Thompson (1914) 219 Mass. 360, 106 N. E. 1009; WRIGHTINGTON, UNIN-
CORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BusINEss TRUSTS (2d ed. 1923) sec. 14;
note (1928) 13 ST. Louis L. Rav. 208. In some states this is decided upon
the basis of the actual facts in the situation. Williams v. Milton (1913)
215 Mass. 1, 102 N. E. 355; Goldwater v. Oltman (1930) 210 Cal. 408, 292
Pac. 624; cf. Crocker v. Malley (1919) 249 U. S. 223. In Missouri and
other states the court will look to the letter of the written agreement and
disregard all else. Darling v. Buddy (1927) 318 Mo. 784, 1 S. W. (2d)
163; Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Sullivan (1924) 103 Okla. 78, 229 Pac. 561.
The Texas courts have frankly announced that they will not be troubled
with this question and will hold all business trusts to be in reality partner-
ships. Thompson v. Schmitt (1925) 115 Tex. 53, 274 S. W. 554. A similar
view has been reached in Kansas and Washington, but in these latter states
it is based upon a construction of the definition of a corporation in the state
constitutions and the corollary holding that a business trust is merely an
organization whose sponsors have not fulfilled the requisites of legal cor-
porate existence. State ex rel. Colvin v. Paine (1926) 137 Wash. 566, 243
Pac. 2; Weber Engine Co. v. Alter (1926) 120 Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143. The
provisions involved are the same as Article 12, section 11 of the Con-
stitution of Missouri, but the Missouri courts have not felt themselves com-
pelled to reach this drastic result. Darling v. Buddy, supra. If the
organization is in reality a partnership despite its use of the trust form,
the individual unit holders are liable as partners to the full extent of their
wealth to any creditor. Neville v. Gifford (1922) 242 Mass. 124, 36 N. E.
360; Rand v. Morse (C. C. A. 8, 1923) 289 F. 339. However, if there is a
clause, as there usually is, in the agreement limiting the liability of the
unit holders to the amount they have already paid, this clause will protect
them even if the organization is a partnership if the creditor contracted
with reference to it when he extended the credit. McCarthy V. Parker
(1923) 243 Mass. 465, 138 N. E. 8; Oden v. Bone (Tex. Civ. App. 1924)
263 S. W. 640; and cf. Betts v. Hackathorn (1923) 159 Ark. 621, 252 S. W.
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602 and Walker v. Hatfield (Mo. App. 1929) 17 S. W. (2d) 357 (reaching a
similar result with reference to a clause limiting the liability of the trus-
tee). If the organization created can be held to be a true trust, the courts
have assumed that this is sufficient to release the unit holder, who is now a
cestui que trust, from any further liability. Krey Packing Co. v. Hitchings
(Mo. App. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 123; Henry G. Taussig Co. v. Poindexter
(1930) 224 Mo. App. 580; 30 S. W. (2d) 635; and cases cited above on
the distinction between partnerships and true trusts. But this result should
not necessarily follow. In the law concerning normal trusts it has been
held that a trustee who has been forced to pay on contracts rightfully made
by him for the benefit of the trust estate has an equitable right of reim-
bursement from the cestui personally, if the trust estate is exhausted, pro-
vided the cestui is sui juris and has not renounced his beneficial interest.
Rensselaer & S. B. R. R. Co. v. Miller (1874) 47 Vt. 146; Hardoon v. Belilios
(1901) A. C. 118; Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of
Trusts (1915) 28 HARv. L. REV. 727; 2 PERRY, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUS-
TES (7th ed. 1929) 824; and cf. Hoch v. Duluth Brewing and Malting Co.
(1928) 173 Minn. 374, 217 N. W. 503. There would seem to be no reason
why this doctrine should not be applied to business trusts as well, unless
prohibited by the terms of the trust agreement. Since this liability would
be proportional to the amount of the interests of the various cestuis,
rather than each being liable for the whole of the debt, it would not prove
of much benefit to the creditor to force the trustee to assign this equitable
right of reimbursement to him, unless the units were owned by a relatively
few persons. The fact that the business trust has been discharged in bank-
ruptcy does not protect the unit holders from any of these liabilities. Krey
Packing Co. v. Hitchings, supra; National Bankruptcy Act sec. 4b (def-
initely providing this with respect to stockholders of corporations, while
we have seen that the business trust is by definition a corporation in this
Act). Apparently the only real result of throwing a business trust into
bankruptcy is to substitute for the trustees some other person, presumably
more satisfactory to the creditors, in the actual control of the trust assets
for the purpose of their liquidation.
Thus, under no circumstances should the unit holders have been allowed
to file as creditors. It is true that in the particular case the circumstances
appear to be such that the unit holders were entitled to every sympathy as
the victims of mismanagement and fraud by the trustee; but still these
large "claims" should not have been permitted to diminish the proportion
that the true general creditors would receive of their claims. To illustrate
the serious practical effects of such proceedings, let us suppose that the
assets of the trust available to pay general creditors amounted to $200,000,
while there were ordinary creditors to the extent of $250,000 and unit hold-
ers who had paid $550,000 for their units, which were stated to have that
par value. If the unit holders are not permitted to file as creditors, the
ordinary creditors will receive a dividend of eighty cents on the dollar, while
if the unit holders may file, both classes will receive only twenty-five cents
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on the dollar. Although the receipt of dividends after such unauthorized
procedure would be effective to constitute an estoppel to contest the
validity of the sale by the trustee in bankruptcy, still it is very unfortunate
that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not specifically denounce the prac-
tice as being contrary to law, for the silent acquiescence in it may lead
other bankruptcy courts and referees into serious error. G. W. S., '33.
JOINT TENANCY-JOINT DEPOSITS-RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATOR AGAINST
SuRVIVOR.-Deceased had deposited sums of money with a bank, receiving
in return time deposit certificates payable to the order of herself. Some
time later she came to the bank and told the cashier she wanted to ar-
range it so that her husband could get the money in case she died. The
cashier then cancelled the old certificates and made out a new one "payable
to the order of herself . . . or . . . her husband." After her death a
dispute arose as to whether the money belonged to her husband or to
the administrator of her estate. Held, that it passed directly to her hus-
band by right of survivorship. Murphy v. Wolfe (Mo. 1932) 45 S. W.
(2d) 1079. In dealing with the Missouri statute providing that when a
deposit is made in the name of the depositor and another and in form to be
paid to either or the survivor it becomes their joint property and on the
death of either is payable to the other, [R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5400], the
Court held that this statute did not apply in the principal case because of
the narrow construction placed on that statute in previous cases by the
Missouri courts.- In order to come within the purview of the statute, as
construed by these earlier decisions, the deposit must be made in form to be
paid to either or the survivor of them. Ambruster v. Ambruster (1930)
326 Mo. 51, 31 S. W. (2d) 28; Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Smith (1928)
320 Mo. 989, 9 S. W. (2d) 58. Consequently the decision is based on the
common law, that is, non-statutory law.
When money is deposited by A to be paid to "A or B," there is a wide
divergence of opinion among the courts as to B's right of direct survivor-
ship on the death of A. B's right to the money has been sustained or de-
nied on the basis of one of four theories, the gift theory, trust theory,
testamentary theory, or joint-tenancy theory. The majority of decisions
hold that in order to sustain B's right to the fund without its passing
through administration, the transaction in creating B's interest must con-
stitute a gift. Commercial Trust Co. v. White (N. J. Eq. 1926) 132 At.
761; McLeod v. Hennepin County Say. Bank (1920) 145 Minn. 299, 176
N. W. 987; Pearre v. Grossnickle (1921) 139 Md. 274, 115 Atl. 49; Wolfe 'V.
Hoefke (1923) 124 Wash. 495, 214 Pac. 1047. Some decisions have held
that even though there is not sufficient delivery to constitute a gift, it may
be sustained as a trust. Connea v. San Francisco Say. & L. Soc. (1924)
70 Cal. App. 180, 232 Pac. 755; Ladner v. Ladner (1921) 128 Miss. 75,
90 So. 593. The soundness of this theory is questionable in view of the
modern view that equity will not create a trust out of an imperfect gift.
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